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Abstract. We give theoretical, partial equilibrium comparisons of a tax with thresholds,
tradable targets (‘emissions trading’ or ET), and non-tradable targets, as mechanisms to abate
well-mixed (‘global’) emissions from many parties, under independent uncertainties in both
future business-as-usual emissions and marginal abatement costs. All three mechanisms are
revenue-neutral, and use flexible thresholds or targets indexed continuously to parties’ activity
levels. We analyse both risk-neutral or risk-averse behaviour. Key theoretical results are that
because of emissions uncertainty, there is no simple Weitzman (1974) rule for choosing
between ‘prices’ (a tax) to ‘quantities’ (ET); under ET, marginal abatement cost uncertainty
is a benefit, compared to certainty; and under risk aversion, any mechanism with more
expected welfare also gives more expected abatement. We apply our theory to global
greenhouse gas abatement in 2020, using an 18-region numerical simulation model with new
uncertainty estimates. Key global, empirical results are that under either risk behaviour, a tax
dominates ET, which hugely dominates non-tradable targets; and under risk aversion, an
optimally indexed tax gives about 60% more welfare and 30% more abatement than
unindexed ET, while optimally indexed ET achieves about two-fifths of these improvements.
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The literature comparing control and planning mechanisms under
uncertainty has a long history, dating back to Weitzman (1974) and other
authors in the early 1970s. By assuming locally quadratic benefit and cost
functions with uncorrelated uncertainties for a single producer or polluter in
a risk-neutral world, Weitzman showed that ‘prices’ (or a tax) outperform
‘quantities’ (a target or regulatory standard) when the marginal cost curve
is steeper than the marginal benefit curve at the expected social optimum;
and that the degree of outperformance depends solely on the uncertainty in
the marginal cost level. Related literature since then on the design of control
mechanisms has explored many extensions such as price-quantity hybrids
(Roberts and Spence 1976, Pizer 2002), correlation of benefit and cost
uncertainty (Stavins 1996) and stock pollutant effects (Hoel and Karp 2002).
In recent years global greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement has inspired
many further extensions. The failure of the Kyoto Protocol to involve key
developing countries and the USA has been partly attributed to the
Protocol’s imposition of fixed quantities. This has given rise to the concept
of GHG intensity targets, as a variant to alleviate the cost of uncertainty
(Ellerman and Sue Wing 2003, and unpublished work by Quirion 2003 and
Sue Wing et al 2005). Such literature usually focuses on uncertainties in
business-as-usual (BAU) emissions, rather than marginal abatement costs
(MACs) as in Weitzman, but an important exception is Quirion (2004),
whose main contribution is to introduce the marginal cost of public funds
into a Weitzman-style comparison of prices and quantities.
By contrast with the above, we model any number of emitting parties,
and give parallel analyses, under exogenous uncertainties in BAU emissions
1and MACs, of three mechanism types: tradable targets, better known as
emissions trading (ET); non-tradable targets (NTTs); and an emissions tax.
This allows for three different levels of stochasticity in emission prices: a
certain global price under the tax; an uncertain global price under ET, which
transmits party-level uncertainties globally; and uncertain local shadow
prices under Non-Tradable Targets (NTTs). Since we also make several
other simultaneous generalisations of the Weitzman framework, so we
content ourselves with considering only a ‘global’ (i.e. uniformly-mixed)
pollutant and with price-taking behaviour, so that both non-uniform
pollutants and imperfect competition remain for further work. At least as far
as existing market-based control schemes go, global pollution includes many
pollutants other than GHGs, such as SO2 in the USA (see for example
Joskow and Schmalensee 1998) though none fit the bill as well as GHGs.
In including an emissions tax, we are swimming against the tide of the
many policy debates currently focused on ET: for example for GHGs
everywhere, now that a carbon tax has been abandoned as a politically viable
option, or for almost all well-mixed pollutants in North America. However,
it is well known how taxes are in principle preferable to ET for GHGs (Pizer
2002, though he shows that hybrid mechanisms are even better), an insight
clear from Weitzman’s basic result because of the effective flatness of the
marginal benefit curve for long-lived, long-accumulated stock pollutants. To
restore the political viability of a tax we make it revenue-neutral, with no
loss of abatement cost efficiency, by using tax thresholds like property rights
(Pezzey 1992), and a novel adjustment mechanism to ensure that revenue-
neutrality is still exactly achieved under uncertainty. This mechanism loses
welfare compared to a simple revenue-raising tax because of the tax
interaction effect (see for example Bovenberg and Goulder 1996, Goulder et
al. 1999), but so does ET with free permit allocations, and we wish to
2compare a tax and ET on a politically level, therefore revenue-neutral,
playing field.
1
We include risk aversion by constructing a strictly concave ‘payoff
function’ to introduce diminishing marginal utility to parties of expected
dollar amounts. Any such function is hard to quantify, and indeed our
modelling involves inference rather than measurement of its key parameters.
However, we include it both in the hope of greater political realism; and also
because in contrast to a risk-neutral world, it allows any mechanism which
increases expected payoff by neutralising more uncertainty to increase the
overall stringency of optimal abatement, a phenomenon we call endogenous
targets. In practice it turns out this requires some equity criterion to give
a politically sensible target distribution, which also contributes to and
informs political realism.
Our contribution to the debate on abatement mechanism choice is best
summed up as a simultaneous, fivefold generalisation of Weitzman’s partial
equilibrium framework, into a single-period model of Mechanisms for
Abating Global Emissions under Stochasticity (MAGES), which includes:
- exogenous uncertainties in both BAU emissions and MACs;
- many emitting parties, which can be firms or countries, depending on
whether pollutant is national or truly global;
- a primary choice of revenue-neutral mechanism type among ET, a tax
with thresholds and NTTs (unsurprisingly, NTTs will be welfare-
1. Where parties are countries, whatever their realised financial loss or gain from a
tax with thresholds, the country can choose how it distributes losses and gains among
producers and consumers. So the valid distributional concern that GHG control will
create monopoly profits for carbon producers, raised by Pezzey and Park (1998) and
quantified by Bovenberg and Goulder (2001), which suggests using a non-revenue-
neutral mechanism at country level, is a separate issue.
3dominated by ET, but we include it here as an important point of
comparison to single-party analyses like Weitzman);
- a secondary choice of the degree to which the mechanisms targets or
thresholds are indexed to parties’ activity levels (e.g. GDP for countries),
including optimal intensity targets (with indexation optimised
individually) and absolute targets (no indexation) as special cases;
- risk aversion and hence endogenous targets, though for completeness we
also consider risk neutrality for each mechanism.
The MAGES model abstracts from other features in order to be able to
encompass the five above. Dynamics and discounting are absent: we
consider only a one-shot equilibrium some time in the future, and so for
example ignore all problems of the lumpiness and irreversibility of
investments in abatement. We also assume perfect enforcement. As an
empirical application of MAGES, we study global GHG abatement in a
world of 18 regions in 2020, using a new numerical simulation model
(MAGES-GHG) containing many new parameter estimates. As in Nordhaus
and Yang (1996), our model gives regional results, but these and most
calibration details are given in another paper (Jotzo and Pezzey 2006,
hereafter JP) with a primarily empirical focus.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 gives full theoretical details
of the MAGES model, and results for expected global net benefit when this
is the welfare measure that optimal policy chooses to maximise, under the
assumption that all parties are risk-neutral. We also give empirical results
for global GHG abatement in 2020, using MAGES-GHG. In Section 3 we
give theoretical, risk-averse results for expected global payoff when this is
the welfare measure maximised, subject to an equity criterion; and again
give empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
42. THE MODEL, AND RESULTS UNDER RISK NEUTRALITY
Here we build our multi-party, multi-uncertainty, flexible-commitment
generalisation of Weitzman’s classic partial equilibrium model. Section 2.1
defines the three uncertainties in BAU emissions, and general flexible
targets, which enables Section 2.2 to define how emissions trading (ET), a
tax with thresholds and non-tradable targets (NTTs) operate as abatement
mechanisms. Section 2.3 gives basic definitions of (risk-neutral) net benefit
and (risk-averse) ‘payoff’, and Section 2.4 defines each party’s benefit and
cost functions which go into net benefit. Section 2.5 gives the key results
for expected global net benefit under each mechanism, and Section 2.6 gives
the corresponding result for unilateral abatement by all parties. Section 2.7
presents empirical results for the expected global gain in net benefit and
global abatement under each mechanism for GHG abatement in 2020.
The MAGES model applies to any situation where many emitting parties
are small, and ‘global’ emissions (that is, total emissions by all parties) are
well-mixed in some environmental reservoir, which may be the whole world
or just part of it. Each party being ‘small’ means just that it takes any
global endogenous variables, such as emissions or any global permit price,
as given. The parties are indexed either by i = 1,...,n or k = 1,...,n, and these
summation notations are used throughout, for any parameter or variable J:
Σi
n





1Ji ≡Σ −nJi;{ Ji} ≡ (J1,...,Jn) ≡ J. [2.1]
Another notation used everywhere is that a tilde (~) denotes a random
variable, and the same variable without a tilde is its expectation:
J := E[J ~]. [2.2]
[Referees’ Appendix 1 lists the large notation set needed for MAGES.]
5All MAGES variables apply to some unspecified time in the ‘future’, far
enough away for some variables to be significantly stochastic; and the type
of abatement mechanism, and the target levels and degrees of indexation in
that mechanism, must be chosen ‘now’ while stochasticity remains. All
costs and benefits are undiscounted, since they all occur at the same future
time, so there would be no purpose in discounting them from the future to
now, and to save repetition, the ‘future’ qualifier is generally omitted.
2.1 BAU emissions, and emission targets/thresholds
A party’s realised (uncertain), BAU emissions are denoted E ~b
i t/yr. Its
abatement is generally denoted Q ~
i t/yr (superscripts may be added later to
denote specific abatement policies).
2 Its abated emissions are then
E ~
i := E ~b
i − Q ~
i t/yr. [2.3]
We consider three random variables as sources of uncertainty in party i’s
BAU emissions:
− εYi, the proportional random variation in party i’s overall activity level
Y ~
i (such as product output for a firm, or GDP for a country), to which
a fraction αi of expected BAU emissions, E
b
i, are linked;
− εηi, representing uncertainty in party i’s intensity (emissions/activity
ratio) η ~
i;
− ερi, representing uncertainty in a (1−αi) fraction of expected BAU
emissions, which have no link to the activity level.
As explained in more detail in JP, the net effect of these three uncertainties
is that i’s BAU emissions are
E ~b
i ≈ [1+αi(εYi+εηi)+(1−αi)ερi] E
b
i t/yr. [2.4]
2. Typical units are shown only where they first appear, or for clarification.
6Importantly, we assume that εYi, εηi and ερi are three sets of random errors,
all independent of all the others, and with zero means:
3







2 ∀ i,k [2.7]
Next, we define party i’s level of financial commitment to abatement as
a general flexible emissions target (or threshold, for a tax)
X ~
i = Xi(1+βiεYi) t/yr, βi ≥ 0, hence from [2.6], [2.8]
xi = Xi/E
b




Here Xi is the expected target, βi is the degree to which the realised target
X ~
i is indexed to activity, and xi is the expected target as a proportion of
BAU emissions. We focus on two special cases, of which the second
appears to be new:




i = Xi; [2.11]




The reason for calling the latter ‘optimal’ will become clear soon.
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We often need the difference between party i’s BAU emissions and its
target/threshold, and from [2.9] and [2.4] it is:
3. In principle, MAGES can handle non-independence, but we would then need to
include theoretically, and estimate empirically, a matrix of (3n−1)(3n/2) covariances.
4. A third special case, considered at length in JP, is βi =1 ∀ i, known as standard




i(1+εYi). Because this is much the more





i − Xi + N ~
Ei, hence E ~b−X ~ = E
b − X + N ~
E; [2.14]
where a party’s net emissions uncertainty (net of any neutralising effect of
target indexing by βi)i s
N ~
Ei := [(αi−βixi)εYi+αiεηi+(1−αi)ερi] E
b
i. [2.16]
From [2.6] and [2.7], expected squared net emissions uncertainty is then:












with global expected squared net emissions uncertainty, and expected global
squared net emission uncertainty being both:

















The formulae for the special cases in [2.11] and [2.13] are needed later.
For absolute targets, denoted by
0:
N ~0

















while for intensity targets, denoted by
*:
N ~*
















Using the above notations, our chosen control mechanisms, as laid down
by some national policy or international treaty (we mostly use ‘policy’) are:
(a) Emissions Trading (ET), denoted
T. We assume the policy defines a set




b, to make expected
abatement positive) and indexes {βi}, which are combined using [2.8]
into a set of flexible realised targets, {X ~T
i}, given freely (grandfathered)
to i. Because targets are tradable, perfect enforcement makes abated
emissions equal the target only at the global level:
E ~T = X ~T t/yr. [2.26]
A party’s (realised) emission trading revenue (possibly negative) is its
target X ~T
i minus its abated emissions E ~T
i, times the emission price
attained by the global permit market, denoted p ~T $/t (which determines
abatement Q ~T
i, and is itself determined later). So from [2.3]:
R ~T




and global revenue-neutrality is automatic (R ~T ≡ 0 from [2.26] and
[2.3]).
(b) An emissions tax with thresholds (‘control by price’), denoted
$ and










Thresholds are akin to property rights like grandfathered tradable targets,















i), the role of the
thresholds X
$
i originated in Mumy’s (1980) ‘property rights sharing’, and
was taken up by Pezzey (1992) and Quirion (2004) as ‘baseline effluent
rights’, and by Farrow (1995) as ‘tax credits’. Our first contribution is
to allow thresholds to be flexible rather than fixed, for symmetry with
9the other mechanisms rather than as a practical proposal for policy.
Whether or not thresholds are flexible, uncertainty has an important
effect on (global) revenue-neutrality. The authority is assumed to know
the expected parameters in [2.28] and thus how to set p
$ so that
expected total emissions E
$(p
$) equal expected total thresholds X
$ and
thus make expected revenue zero. (This does not have to happen, of
course; Pezzey (1992) stresses that X
$ is a political choice, that should
be free to lie anywhere between 0 and E
$(p
$).) But it cannot make
realised total emissions E ~$ equal realised total thresholds X ~$ and thus
realised revenue zero. Its realised gross payment to all parties is:
K ~$ = p
$[X ~$−E ~$(p





$)] ≡ 0. [2.31]
Our second contribution to the tax-with-thresholds mechanism is
therefore to introduce a clawback to make global revenue zero in every




$)K ~$ each party. This is effectively a lump sum beyond i’s
influence which makes i’s net tax revenue equal to:
R ~$




$)K ~$, with global realised neutrality, R ~$ ≡ 0. [2.32]
(c) Non-Tradable Targets (NTTs, ‘control by quantities’), denoted
@. Here
the authority mandates (and perfectly enforces) that each party i’s abated
emissions equal its flexible target X ~@




i = X ~@
i t/yr, with obviously no trading revenue, R ~@
i ≡ 0. [2.33]
For definitions and results common to all three abatement policy
mechanisms, we use




@. We use a second
superscript
0 or
* to show when targets/thresholds are absolute or (optimal)
intensity, respectively.
102.3 Unilateral vs. policy abatement, and net benefit and payoff
We focus on three ‘future’, symmetric equilibrium states of the world,
each with a condition determining (future, uncertain) emissions abatement:
(i) No abatement, so that all parties have BAU emissions;
(ii) All parties abate collectively in accordance with a policy, already
defined as a government policy for all emitting parties (usually firms)
in one country, or an international treaty signed by all emitting
countries (or groups of countries) on the globe. A policy is defined
by its choices of mechanism type (ET vs tax vs NTT), target or
threshold levels {Xi} and indexing {βi}, and (for the tax only) the
emission tax rate, p
$.
(iii) All parties abate unilaterally, with variables in this state denoted
U.
This differs from no abatement, since any party that cares about global
abatement will do some abatement on its own, albeit much less than
under a policy.
These three states suffice for our analysis of cooperative (or within a nation,
compulsory) policy formation. For non-cooperative analyses, other,
asymmetric states − such as only some parties joining a treaty while others
abate unilaterally (i.e. free-ride on the treaty) − would obviously be
interesting too, but these remain for further work.
Two alternative measures are available in MAGES to compare the
desirability of policy-based abatement both among mechanisms, and with
unilateral abatement:
− Party i’s net benefit from abatement policy j compared to no abatement
is A ~j
i $/yr (its ‘Advantage’). This is its dollar-valued benefit B ~j
i of
global abatement Q ~j, including its trading or tax revenue (if any) under
11the policy, minus the cost C ~j
i of its own abatement Q ~j
i:
A ~j
i := B ~j
i − C ~j
i. [2.34]
[2.34] also applies to the unilateral state, i.e. A ~U
i := B ~U
i − C ~U
i. This
assumes that the net benefit a party perceives from the introduction of
an abatement policy is framed solely in terms of the financial and
environmental consequences of the policy. We discuss this important
framing effect further in JP. A quite different caveat is that In a second-
best world, [2.34] should be amended to allow for the marginal cost of
public funds being greater than unity (Quirion 2004), but this remains
for further work. What in fact we report later is the gain in net benefit
by moving from unilateral to abatement using mechanism j:
G ~j
i := A ~j
i − A ~U
i. [2.35]
− Party i’s payoff from moving from unilateral to abatement mechanism
j is defined as the gain in net benefit between the two states, plus a






i) $/yr; zi $/yr > 0, r yr/$ > 0. [2.36]
The strictly concave form of payoff makes parties risk averse, and we
feel maximising payoff should give a more realistic guide than maximising
net benefit to parties’ decisions about abatement policy proposals. (The U
notation for payoff in [2.36] is suggestive of ‘utility’ and hence a
diminishing marginal utility of income, and is not to be confused with the
U for unilateralism in [2.35].) So in Section 3 we focus on expected global
payoff, E[ΣU ~j
i], as a measure of the desirability of abatement policy j.
Formula [2.36] assumes that cross-party variations in risk aversion can be
12adequately captured by variations in the scaling parameters {zi}, leaving the
curvature parameter r as a global constant, and that is what we consider
most justified in the empirical GHG case. However, the algebra is quite
workable with a set of curvature parameters, {ri}, instead.
Despite our ultimate preference for risk aversion, we give results in this
Section for the risk-neutral case, where the optimal policy is to choose
emission targets/thresholds and (perhaps) an emission price to maximise
expected global net benefits. We can then make interesting comparisons of
our results to those in Weitzman (1974), who assumed risk neutrality. And
to clarify these comparisons, we highlight subcases of abatement
mechanisms where the distribution of targets among parties within a given
total has no effect on expected global net benefit, and so remains
indeterminate under risk neutrality.
2.4 Abatement benefits and costs
We assume that dollar-valued benefit that party i gets from abatement
mechanism j giving global (well-mixed) abatement Q ~j is:
B ~j
i(Q ~j): = ViQ ~j −½ Wi(Q ~j)




B ~(Q ~j): = VQ ~j −½ W(Q ~j)
2 $/yr [2.39]
Calibration of the benefit parameters {Vi} and {Wi} in the GHG case is done
by inference, so as to produce plausible global abatement in our Reference
Case, defined as using emissions trading with absolute targets when risk
aversion is taken into consideration (which is done only in Section 3).
13For i’s abatement costs (net of emissions trading), we assume that:
C ~j
i(Q ~j
i) = ½(1/Mi)(Q ~j
i)
2 + Q ~j




2 + (1/Mi)Q ~j
iN ~
Ci − R ~j
i, where [2.41]
N ~
Ci := MiεCi,E [ εCi]=0 ; E [ εCi
2]= :σCi
2; and hence [2.42]
C ~j
i′(Q ~j
i) = (1/Mi)Q ~j
i + εCi = (1/Mi)Q ~j
i + (1/Mi)N ~
Ci. [2.43]
Parameter Mi t
2/$.yr is called an abatement potential, and 1/Mi is the slope
of i’s MAC curve. As in Weitzman (1974), we call εCi the shift uncertainty
in MAC, and unlike his full analysis (as noted by Stavins 1996), we assume
εCi is independent of all other uncertainties (εCk, εYi, εηk, etc), [2.44]
so if we also define




2, then DC := ΣMi
2σCi
2 =E [ N ~
C
2]. [2.46]
Both the calibration of {Mi} for the 2020 GHG case, and a discussion
of the plausibility of this independence assumption in that case, are given in
JP. We have left a shift uncertainty out of the benefit function [2.38]
because we found, after Weitzman (1974), that such uncertainties had no
effect on any risk-neutral results (though could perhaps have a minor effect
on expected payoff), as long as they are uncorrelated with the cost
uncertainties introduced next. As noted by Stavins (1996), this may then
limit the practical applicability of our results; but such correlation is
negligible in the greenhouse case used here as an empirical case study.
Equations [2.34], [2.38] and [2.41] together mean that i’s realised net
benefit from mechanism j is
A ~j
i = ViQ ~j −½ Wi(Q ~j)
2 − ½(1/Mi)(Q ~j
i)
2 − (1/Mi)Q ~j
iN ~
Ci + R ~j
i [2.48]
142.5 Expected global net benefit under policy abatement
We now give formulae for the expected global net benefit from using
each abatement mechanism under a risk-neutral policy objective of
maximising expected global net benefit. The computation of each formula
starts with some way of choosing each party’s abatement so that its MAC
equals some global emission price or shadow price (not so that individual
net benefit A ~j
i is maximised). However, the ways for ET and a tax both
entail individual agents in all parties using their market freedom to choose
their abatement and hence their abated emissions, so as to maximise their
profits by equating their realised individual MACs with the global permit
price or tax.
No such freedom is allowed with non-tradable targets (NTTs), where the
authority mandates parties’ abated emissions to equal targets, which it
chooses so that parties’ expected MACs are all the same, shadow price, so
as to achieve any given global abatement at minimum expected total cost.
Though under the general rule [2.8], X ~@
i is flexible in responding to i’s
emissions uncertainty, it does not respond to i having unexpectedly high or
low MAC, and this is the source of NTTs’ relative inefficiency.
So with ET, MAC (C ~
i′ from [2.43]) is equated to the global permit
price:
(1/Mi)Q ~T
i + (1/Mi)N ~
Ci = p ~T,
which on rearranging gives
Q ~T
i = p ~TMi − N ~
Ci, hence Q ~T = p ~TM − N ~
C = E ~b − X ~T, [2.49]
which on using [2.4] gives








T)/M (> 0 by choice of X
T, so some abatement occurs).
[2.51]
5
Hence p ~T = p
T +( N ~
E+N ~
C)/M, which with [2.49] gives
Q ~T = p
TM + N ~
E = E
b − X
T + N ~
E. [2.52]
Three observations apply to these intermediate results. First, the linearity of
MAC [2.43] means that a choke price E
b
i/Mi exists, at which expected,
abated emissions are zero. In practice zero emissions may be impossible,
meaning there are limits beyond which the quadratic cost function [2.41] is
unacceptably inaccurate − a caution which applies to all three mechanisms.
Second, [2.50] means that under ET, a party’s trading revenue is affected not
just by its own uncertainties, but also by all other parties’ uncertainties
N ~
E+N ~
C, transmitted through the global price p ~T. Third, [2.50] also shows
that even though p
T > 0 because X
T < E
b by assumption, extreme realisations
can have p ~T < 0 (hence no emissions trading). In our GHG empirical case,
the latter occurs only about once in a thousand realisations, so we ignore it.








$Mi − N ~
Ci and Q ~$ = p





$)/M, again assumed > 0 for abatement to occur. [2.55]
5. In theory, the realised permit price p ~ in [2.50] could be negative in some
realisations, which would imply a subsidy on emissions or a penalty for holding
emissions permits. However, this is of no empirical relevance in the modelling, as
occurs in 0.25% of random realisations at most in the scenarios presented in this
paper.
16With NTTs, the authority chooses each non-tradable target X
@
i so that





@ ∀ i, for some p
















Then from [2.33], [2.4] and [2.57], i’s realised abatement is:
Q ~@
i = E ~b





i + N ~
Ei = p
@Mi + N ~
Ei [2.59]
Appendices 1-3 then establish the following risk-neutral, expected global
net benefits
6 for the three mechanisms (where the DCi term in the tax result
has been aligned to make comparison with the ET result easier):
Proposition 1: Optimised expected global net benefits from a global
abatement policy instead of no abatement are
for emissions trading (ET) with flexible targets:
A
T = A −T −½ Σ(1/M+W)DEi(x
T
i)+ ½ Σ(1/Mi−1/M)DCi; [2.60]
for a tax with flexible thresholds:
A
$ = A −$ +½ Σ(1/Mi−W)DCi; [2.61]
for non-tradable, flexible targets (NTTs):
A






















and then the corresponding global expectation A. However, the results for A ~j
i itself
matter only when expected payoff is maximised, so we report them in Section 3.
17One obvious feature of these results is that the tax eliminates emissions
uncertainty, and NTTs eliminate MAC uncertainty, while ET eliminates
neither. This stems directly from the different ways (control by ‘tradable
quantities’, ‘price’ or ‘quantities’) in which the mechanisms operate. Also
obvious from [2.60] and [2.61] is:
Corollary 1: (a) Under emissions trading, Marginal Abatement Cost
uncertainty increases expected global net benefit compared to certainty; (b)
under a tax, MAC uncertainty increases expected global net benefit
compared to certainty, provided the slope of the global marginal benefit
curve is lower than a weighted mean slope of the marginal cost curves.
The increase under (a), ½Σ(1/Mi−1/M)DCi, is positive whenever M = ΣMk >
Mi, i.e. in any multi-party world. (Typically, 1/Mi >> 1/M, and for MAGES-
GHG with n = 18, M > 4 [maxi{Mi}], which is for China.) Intuitively, if all
parties take the global emission price as given (as with ET and a tax, but not
NTTs), any deviation in a party’s MAC gives a decrease or increase of
producer surplus proportional to the deviation squared, and hence a positive
mean increase. A simple algebraic illustration is the expected surplus from
choosing an equal chance of quantities q+ε or q−ε, instead of a certain q,





2 > 0. The single-party equivalent of effect (b), where ½Σ(1/Mi−W)DCi
> 0 whenever W <[ Σ(1/Mi)DCi]/DC, was present but unremarked in
Weitzman (1974). The insight that MAC uncertainty improves the
attractiveness of both ET and a tax appears to have been overlooked so far.
More precise comparisons of the three mechanisms are hampered
whenever the DEi terms depend on {xi}. So let us consider only the cases
of absolute or (optimal) intensity targets (hence the DEi’s have no
18dependence on xi’s, from [2.22] and [2.24]), or of no emissions uncertainty
(hence all DEi = 0). In such cases, the only effect of target choice on net
benefit is the effect of the total X on the emission price p, and hence on
A −[p]. The optimal policy then entails an indeterminate target distribution
{xi}, and the same optimal price (say p −) for all three mechanisms. The latter
comes from setting A −′[p]=VM − M(1+WM)p − = 0, and makes expected
global abatement, target total, benefit, cost and net benefit also the same for
all three mechanisms, namely:
Proposition 2: Risk-neutral, global results when target distribution is




price = p − := V/(1+WM) $/t;
7 ) [2.64]
abatement = Q − := p −M t/yr; )
target total = X − := E
b − p −M t/yr; )
and certainty components (i.e. ignoring all D-terms) of benefit and cost are
benefit = B − := ½p −M(p −+V) $/yr; )
cost = C − := ½p −2M $/yr; )
net benefit = A − := ½p −VM $/yr. )
So in Proposition 1 we now have A −T = A −$ = A −@ = A −, and the only
differences among mechanisms are in the net costs of uncertainty (the DEi
and DCi terms). Now consider emissions uncertainty again, but confined
again to absolute or intensity targets so that Proposition 2 applies. We then
immediately have the following five results which are easy to compare
7. Note how, from [2.39] and the expectation of [2.49], [2.54] or [2.57], p − obeys the
Samuelson (1954) prescription for the optimal price of a public good under certainty,
namely p − = B′(Q −)=V − WQ − = V − Wp −M.





Proposition 3: Risk-neutral, global expected benefits from abatement when
target distribution is indeterminate are,
for emissions trading (ET) with absolute targets:
A
T0 =½ p −VM −½ Σ(1/M+W)D
0
Ei +½ Σ(1/Mi−1/M)DCi; [2.65]
for emissions trading (ET) with (optimal) intensity targets:
A
T* =½ p −VM −½ Σ(1/M+W)D
*
Ei +½ Σ(1/Mi−1/M)DCi; [2.66]
for a tax with general flexible thresholds:
A
$ =½ p −VM +½ Σ(1/Mi−W)DCi; [2.67]
for non-tradable, absolute targets (NTTs):
A
@0 =½ p −VM −½ Σ(1/Mi+W)D
0
Ei. [2.68]
for non-tradable, (optimal) intensity targets (NTTs):
A
@* =½ p −VM −½ Σ(1/Mi+W)D
*
Ei. [2.69]
In comparing one mechanism to another, perhaps the most striking point
is the loss of Weitzman’s simple rule for choosing prices over quantities,
now that both emissions and MAC are uncertain. A higher global marginal
benefit, W, reduces net benefit from price control because of the −½WDC in
[2.68], but it also reduces net benefit from (tradable or non-tradable) quantity
control because of the −½WDE in the other four results.





showing large gains from making targets tradable, which stem from both





that target flexibility increases net benefit by much more if targets are non-
tradable than if they are tradable. In Section 2.7 we will report empirical
20results for ET and NTTs only for the above five cases.
2.6 Expected global net benefit under unilateral abatement
We give unilateral results here for use later. A simple variant of [2.48]
also applies to the unilateral case, namely that net benefit is
A ~U
i := ViQ ~U −½ Wi(Q ~U)
2 − ½(1/Mi)(Q ~U
i)
2 − (1/Mi)Q ~U
iN ~
Ci. [2.70]
Individually optimal abatement Q ~U
i is chosen to maximise A ~U
i on the non-
cooperative assumption that ∂Q ~U/∂Q ~U
i = 1, giving (see Appendix 4)
Q ~U = Σ(ViMi−N ~
Ci) / (1+ΣWkMk), hence [2.71]
Q
U = ΣViMi / (1+ΣWkMk); and [2.72]
A ~U
i := ViQ ~U −½ Wi(Q ~U)






















2] + ½(1/Mi)DCi. [2.77]
2.7 Empirical, risk-neutral results in GHG case
Here we give key results from combining the above, risk-neutral
MAGES formulae with the parameter values and program of the MAGES-
GHG numerical model, to show the effects of using alternative mechanisms
for the case of GHG abatement in 2020. The model divides the globe into
18 regions or countries, known just as ‘countries’, ranging in GDP from
Argentina and Australia to the USA and Europe. Five are high-income
countries (known together as ‘the North’), while thirteen are low-income
ones (‘the South’). In Table 1 we report only the global totals or ranges of
the country data we used; as already noted, the full calibration data and their
21Table 1 Selected, mainly global, parameters in MAGES model of GHG
abatement in an 18-country world in 2020
$ = US$(2000); t = tonne CO2-equivalent;G=1 0
9;T=1 0
12
Parameter Calibrated value and units
L = global population 8.2 G
Y = global GDP 88.0 T$/yr
( E2000 = global emissions of GHGs in 2000 40.9 Gt/yr )
E




b = weighted average share of emissions
linked with GDP (= energy sector share)
0.64
V = global linear valuation of abatement 21.9 $/t
W = slope of global marginal benefit 0.219 $.yr/G(t
2)
M = global abatement potential 0.431 G(t
2)/$.yr
{σYi} = standard deviations of proportional
uncertainty in GDP
0.13 (North), 0.18 (South)
{σηi} = standard deviations of proportional
uncertainty in intensity
0.15 (North), 0.25 (South)
{σρi} = standard deviations of proportional
emissions uncertainty outside energy sector
0.2
{σCi} = standard deviation of absolute uncertainty
in MAC
4.2 $/t (for all i)
z = risk aversion weighting parameter 1$
2/yr
2.person
r = worldwide risk aversion parameter 0.085 yr/$
origins are reported in JP.
22Two important features of our calibration methods are worth noting here.
First, global valuation parameters V and W are inferred so that a global
climate treaty results in a halving of 2000-2020 global emissions growth
compared to BAU in our Reference Case, relative to which all percentage
comparisons are reported. (A more comprehensive approach might be a
survey of expert opinion in each country along the lines of Weitzman 2001,
but that would take much extra work.) Second, with yi := Yi/Li (per capita
GDP), we set each risk-aversion scaling parameter
zi =1 / yi, [2.77a]
as reported in the Table. The 1/yi factor matches the stylised fact that
uncertainty matters more in poor (low yi) countries, but we have no further
stylised facts to use to calibrate country-level risk curvature parameters {ri}.
So a global r is chosen, inferred so that global abatement in the Reference
Case is one third lower than it would be under risk neutrality (r = 0).
Expected global results for risk-neutral optimisation are reported in
Table 2. Empirical results are derived by averaging over a large number of
runs where stochastic variables take on random values. MAGES is thus
implemented as a stochastic, Monte Carlo simulation model. This makes it
possible to impose truncations on the distributions of stochastic variables,
both for more realistic representation of permit markets and for modelling
of certain policy instruments. The alternative method of implementing the
theoretically derived expectation formulae such as [2.74] directly in a
numerical model would not allow truncations, and quickly reaches
computational constraints in implementations as a multi-region model. For
each scenario, the model is computed for 10,000 random realisations, with
joint draws of the stochastic parameters. Realised BAU emissions are
23Table 2 Results for GHG abatement mechanisms under risk-neutrality
(maximisation of expected global net benefit)
(% figures are differences from the Base Case of Emissions Trading with Absolute
targets and risk-neutrality, in contrast to the Reference Case of Section 3)
Mechanism

















(abated emissions E −






















Base Case has price p
T0 = p − = 20 $/t, abatement benefit B − = 180.5 G$/yr, cost
C − = 86.2 G$/yr (0.1% of Y), and net benefit A − = 94.3 G$/yr (using Proposition
2). Unilateral case has abatement Q −U = 0.90 Gt/yr (1.7% of E
b), and expected
net benefits of A −U(Q −U) = 18.2 G$/yr under certainty, and A
U(Q −U) = 24.5 G$/yr
under uncertainty.
truncated at the extreme tails of the distribution, by imposing the constraint
0.33E
b
i < E ~b
i < 1.66E
b
i. This truncation precludes unrealistically low or high
emissions events, and applies in about 0.4% of random realisations.
24The first two columns of numbers in Table 2 give the mechanism’s




from [2.37], rather than A, to ease comparison with the risk-averse results
reported later. Given the complexity of the notation, we list these in full:
G −(Q −): = A −(Q −)−A −U; ) [2.78]
G

















The last two columns of the table show there is no difference in global
abatement among the mechanisms, so no further comment is needed there.
Consider first net benefit A
$ in the tax case. From W << 1/Mi in [2.67],
we know A
$ exceeds the certainty net benefit A − =½ p −VM. However, it turns
out that the uncertain unilateral net benefit A
U exceeds its certainty
equivalent A −U by almost exactly the same amount, making the tax and
certainty gains almost the same; and the tax is clearly the best policy in
principle under uncertainty. Since the tax is unfortunately off most climate
policy agendas, the main question of interest is then how much closer
Emissions Trading can get to the best mechanism by using intensity instead
of absolute targets. The answer is about one third: that is, the gain rises by
4%, compared to a maximum in principle of 14%.
Other points to note are the very poor performance of Non-Tradable
Targets, already discussed theoretically after Proposition 3; and the very
modest abatement level in the Reference Case that has effectively been
chosen by our calibration of the global benefit parameter V. Abatement Q −
of 8.6 Gt/yr is only 16% of BAU emissions, and abated emissions in 2020
25still grow from the 2000 baseline, though by about a third as much as the
32% growth under BAU. This modesty is echoed (for example) in the
certainty element of abatement cost, C − reported at the bottom of the Table,
which is 0.1% of projected global GDP in 2020. This reassures us that this
is an acceptable application of a partial equilibrium model like MAGES.
263 RESULTS UNDER RISK AVERSION AND ENDOGENOUS
TARGETS
In Section 3 we assume that all parties are risk-averse, with their welfare
from a shift to a global abatement mechanism being better represented by a
strictly concave function of the resulting gain net benefit, rather than the
gain itself. Few studies have include risk aversion in analysing global
emissions control under uncertainty (Bohm and Carlen 2002 being a notable
exception), and in our view such inclusion is a vital step towards politically
more realistically analyses. In Section 3.1 we compute expected global
payoff under emissions trading, and in Section 3.2 we do the same for a tax
with thresholds. Non-tradable targets are omitted, for reasons explained
below in Section 3.3, which focuses on the way total abatement changes
when it is global payoff rather than gain which is maximised, and on the
choice of equity criterion which is then needed to make payoff maximisation
result in a sensible distribution of abatement targets among parties. Section
3.4 gives the empirical results for expected global payoff and abatement for
the case of GHG control in 2020.
To allow non-linear expectations to be computed, here we assume that
all errors are normal (and still independent with mean zero)
εYi ∼ N(0,σYi), εηi ∼ N(0,σηi), ερi ∼ N(0,σρi), εCi ∼ N(0,σCi) [3.1]
So defining ε := (εY1,...,εYn,εη1,...,εηn,ερ1,...,ερn,εC1,...,εCn), the expectation of
any random variable J ~ is









273.1 Expected payoffs from Emissions Trading
Appendix 1 shows that party i’s realised net benefit from ET is
A ~T
i = A −T
























i(x): =½ ( Mi/M
2−Wi)N ~
E
2 − (1/M)N ~
Ei
























i)/M + Vi − Wip









For any mechanism j, we define the term F ~j
i to contain all the squared
and cross-multiplied errors (terms in εYi
2 and εYiεCk, etc) in A ~
i, but no other
errors. This makes the expectation of all the other error terms (here the last
three terms of [3.3]) zero. We also define A −j
i as what would be the
expectation of A ~j









i(x) = − (1/M)DEi −½ ( Wi−Mi/M
2)DE
+ [½(1/Mi)−1/M]DCi +½ ( Mi/M
2)DC. [3.11]
It is also worth for future reference giving the variants of [3.11] for the


















Ei +½ ( Mi/M
2)DC + [½(1/Mi)−1/M]DCi.
[3.13]
28From [2.35], [2.36] and [2.77a], i’s payoff from moving from unilateral
abatement to ET is:
U ~T









Expected payoff from this move is then
U
T












For j = either T (ET) or $ (the tax case, dealt with in the next section),
we now define
Z := the 4n x4 n dispersion matrix of our global model, so given our
assumption that all 4n errors are independent, the inverse dispersion
matrix Z









2 on the diagonal and zeros elsewhere; [3.17a]
F
j
i : =a4 n×4n, non-unique matrix such that ε′F
j
iε≡F ~j
i in [3.6] (or [3.29]









i is a 4n-vector that generates the 1st order errors in A ~j
i, i.e. the last
three terms in [3.3] or [3.27] (not just the H-terms), formally defined
by (h
j
i)′ε ≡ A ~j
i − A −j
















intensity targets, are defined in the obvious way using [2.22] and
[2.24] respectively. [3.17e]
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so that our generic final result is
29U
j





















Applying this to the ET case and using [2.22] and [2.24] then gives risk-
averse payoffs for ET with absolute and intensity targets, for which we
report our empirical results:
Proposition 4: Party i’s expected payoff from ET with:
(a) absolute targets compared to unilateralism is
U
T0





















(b) (optimal) intensity targets compared to unilateralism is
U
T*


























i are as in [3.12]-[3.13], A
U
i is as in
[2.74], and the S, Z and h matrices are as in [3.17a]-[3.17e].
For detailed empirical results by country and globally, see JP.
3.2 Expected payoffs for a tax with thresholds
Appendix 2 shows that
A ~$
i = A −$


























i := ½(1/Mi)N ~
Ci
















$ − Vi + Wip
$M [3.32]
The expected net benefit is then
A
$





i = (1/2Mi)DCi −½ WiDC. [3.34]













[3.17e] and [3.27]-[3.32]. Inserting these into the generic final result [3.18]
then gives:
Proposition 5: Party i’s expected payoff from a tax and
(a) absolute thresholds compared to unilateralism is:
U
$0





















(b) (optimal) intensity thresholds compared to unilateralism is:
U
$*






















i is as in [3.28], F
$
i is as in [3.34], and A
U
i is as in [2.74].
3.3 Optimisation, endogenous targets and abatement, and equity criteria
Under Section 2’s assumption that parties are risk-neutral, the optimal
policy for any mechanism was to maximise global expected net benefit A.
In summing the party-level results Ai to produce A, the dependence of Ai on
31the target distribution {xi} cancelled out as long as absolute or intensity
targets were used, and dependence of the {DEi}o n{ xi} was thus avoided.
Optimisation then yielded the simplified results in Proposition 3.
In Section 3, with risk-averse parties, the optimal policy is to maximise
global expected payoff U, and the Ai occur in the exponential terms as well
as in the additive terms of Ui; so they do not just sum to A when the Ui are
summed. In particular, the dependences of all A −
i on xi in [3.4] remain in U,
even if absolute or (optimal) intensity targets are used so that all DEi do not
depend on xi. In turn this means that the optimal choice of target total X
(hence price p(X)), and its distribution {Xi}, depend on how well the
mechanism chosen neutralises uncertainty costs: that is, targets (hence total
abatement and the emission price) are endogenous to mechanism choice,
unlike in Proposition 3. This is an important step, since making targets
endogenous will increase the difference in payoff achieved by moving to a
mechanism that neutralises more uncertainty, compared to the difference
calculated with exogenous targets, that is, targets fixed by some rule that
does not allow them to vary across mechanisms. It also explains why NTTs
are excluded from the risk-averse analysis. Optimising expected global
payoff with NTTs would require each party’s expected shadow price to be
uniquely endogenous to that party, which then invalidates the assumption of
a common shadow price needed to reach results like [2.62].
With endogenous targets, unconstrained maximisation of U will
determine an ‘optimal’ target distribution. However, for our empirical GHG
case, this distribution turns out to be politically nonsensical, with many
parties having zero targets. Since our primary motive for introducing risk
aversion was to increase the political realism of the results, we must
32therefore constrain target distribution to meet some equity criterion.
Maximising payoff U subject to this equity constraint, together with a chosen
standard mechanism type, then comprise a reference case which we can use
as a baseline when comparing the effectiveness of different mechanisms.
In our GHG empirical example, the equity criterion we use is that:
Targets {xi} are distributed so that each country’s optimised, expected
payoff per person is equal: Ui/Li = Uk/Lk for all i, k; and [3.46]
the Reference Case now comprises the use of emissions trading with
absolute targets as an abatement mechanism, and the maximisation of
expected global payoff (U
T0) subject to criterion [3.46]. [3.47]
JP discusses alternative criteria that could have been used, and how sensitive
the optimal payoff is to the choice of criterion in the GHG case. The basic
finding is that although the optimal distribution {xi} obviously varies a lot
across criteria, the comparison between absolute and intensity targets for ET
in terms of expected global payoff is little affected.
Empirically, target distributions that simultaneously fulfil the optimality
and equity criteria are computed in a two-stage iterative algorithm. In a first
set of model runs, for a given overall target X, country targets Xi are varied
until equal expected per capita payoff U (as in [3.46]) is achieved, to within
0.5% for each country i. This is then repeated for different aggregate target
levels X and thus levels of expected abatement Q, until the scenario with
globally optimal expected payoff U (and equal per capita payoff ui) is found.
3.4 Empirical, risk-averse results for GHGs
Expected global results for risk-averse optimisation of GHG abatement
33in 2020 are reported in Table 3, which is laid out like Table 2 to make
comparisons easier. The empirical calibration for the GHG case is as in
Section 2.7, except for additional calibration of the risk aversion parameters
Table 3 Results for GHG abatement mechanisms under risk-aversion
(equity-constrained maximisation of expected global payoff)





















































Unilateral case has abatement Q −U ≈ 0.90 Gt/yr, and expected net benefits
A −U(Q −U) ≈ 18.2 G$/yr under certainty, and A
U(Q −U) ≈ 24.5 G$/yr under
uncertainty.
{zi} and r. As with {Vi} and {Wi}, this is done by inference, this time to a produce
plausible difference in global abatement between a ‘reference case’, which uses ET
with absolute targets, and the same case with risk neutrality (r = 0). We also of course
34switch the welfare measure being maximised and reported from expected global gain
in net benefit compared to unilateralism, G = A−A
U, to expected global payoff versus
unilateralism, U({Gi(Q)}). So the first two columns of numbers in Table 3 give
payoffs U in place of the gains G reported in Table 2.
The ranking of the mechanisms here remains unchanged from the risk-netural
ranking in Table 2. Price-based control (a tax) is preferable to quantity-based control
(emissions trading), and within that, (optimal) indexation is preferable to no indexation
(absolute targets/thresholds). Endogeneity of abatement under risk aversion means that
optimal global abatement now varies with the mechanism chosen, so we can now
assess changes in environmental effectiveness of the treaty, in addition to changes in
welfare. In turn this variation is shown in the arguments of expected payoffs, and in
particular this divides the tax case into separate results for optimal intensity and
absolute thresholds.
Under our calibration, taxes with optimal intensity thresholds (the best
mechanism) yield a 28% increase in global abatement compared to our
reference case of ET with absolute targets, thus bridging seven eighths of the
gap to the certainty case; while non-indexed taxes increase expected
abatement by 25%. ET with optimal indexation gives a 16% increase in
expected global abatement over its non-indexed equivalent. Politically,
activity-indexed tax thresholds might be much less realistic than activity-
indexed targets, so the relevant comparison between prices and quantities
may be between the 25% increase under non-indexed taxes and the 10%
increase under indexed targets.
Expected payoffs show the same ranking as expected abatement, but
with very different magnitudes of differences between mechanisms. All
uncertain payoffs are significantly lower than the corresponding gains in
35Table 2, thanks primarily to the final, risk-aversion terms starting in zi (here
1/yi, as in Table 1) that are found in Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. But




the Reference Case, which is the mechanism that is already the worst
available one for neutralising risk; and least (G
$*(Q −)−U
$*(Q
$*)) for a tax with
optimal intensity thresholds, the best available mechanism. Whereas
switching from the former to the latter improved risk-neutral gain by 14%
in Table 2, here it improves risk-averse payoff by about 4 times as much.
So the welfare differences between ET and a tax, and between indexed and
non-indexed ET, are amplified under risk aversion. However, in contrast to
the abatement results, there is only a small gap between expected payoff
under indexed and non-indexed taxes – this is because expected payoff as
a function of expected abatement is relatively flat around the optimum, in
the tax cases.
Not shown in the Table but worth reporting briefly is the wide range
found in JP (Table III) of optimal indexation, βi = αi/xi, across countries.
The high is βi = 1.30 for Japan, with most (αi = 0.96) of emissions linked
to GDP and a stringent (xi = 0.739) target; and the low is 0.21 for Indonesia,
with the least (0.19) linkage, and a more generous (0.914) target.
364. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has introduced a model of Mechanisms to Abate Global
Emissions under Stochasticity (MAGES), which gives both risk-neutral and
risk-averse analyses of mechanisms for abating well-mixed (‘global’), future
(hence uncertain) emissions from many parties. The model is partial
equilibrium in nature, and so is appropriate to circumstances where
abatement costs are small relative to parties’ GDPs (if countries) or revenues
(if firms). It generalises Weitzman’s classic (1974) stochastic comparison
of ‘price’ vs. ‘quantity’ mechanisms in four main ways at the same time.
First, it applies to many parties, and thus incorporates tradable targets
(‘emissions trading’ or ET) as well as a tax, and non-tradable targets (NTTs),
with all three mechanisms designed to be globally revenue-neutral. For a tax
this entails not just the use of thresholds equivalent to grandfathered target
allocations to make it revenue-neutral on average, but also a pro-rata, lump-
sum rebate of net global tax revenue to make it revenue-neutral in every
realisation of the future.
Second, it includes uncertainties in future business-as-usual emissions −
in fact three uncertainties, only one of which is linked to a party’s activity
level − as well as in marginal abatement costs (MACs). Third, all
‘quantities’, whether target allocations, or thresholds for a tax, are flexible,
being continuously indexed to parties’ activity levels, which includes the
concept of intensity targets, though here with indexation being optimally
tailored to each party.
Fourth, MAGES allows us to analyse optimal policies under both risk-
neutral behaviour, where welfare is defined as expected global net benefit,
and risk-averse behaviour, where welfare (dubbed ‘payoff’) is a strictly
concave function of net benefit. The latter assumption requires the use of
37more speculative data, but we feel it is likely to yield a more realistic
indicator of parties’ reactions to policy choices. Crucially, it also allows us
to model how a better abatement mechanism can achieve not just higher
welfare, but also a better environmental outcome.
Under risk neutrality, several insights followed immediately from the
MAGES results for expected global net benefit under the three mechanisms.
First, the tax neutralises all emissions uncertainties (i.e. prevents them from
affecting net benefit), NTTs neutralises all MAC uncertainties, and ET
neutralises neither, differences which reflect the mechanisms’ different basic
modes of operation. Second, indexation can neutralise some of the
uncertainty costs inherent in emission targets. Third, under ET, higher
marginal abatement cost uncertainty is an unambiguous benefit(!) compared
to certainty. Fourth, because the steepness of the marginal benefit curve
decreases net benefit under both ET (thanks to emissions uncertainty) and
a tax (thanks to MAC uncertainty, as in Weitzman), there is no longer a
simple rule for preferring ‘prices’ (a tax) to ‘quantities’ (ET). Fifth, the
gains from making targets tradable are simple to compute, and large.
Under risk aversion, the endogeneity of the expected global abatement
level prevents simple theoretical comparisons among mechanisms, but we
still found near-analytic formulae for expected global payoff in terms of net
global emissions uncertainties.
Empirically, we applied both risk-neutral and risk-averse versions of the
MAGES theory to greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement in 2020, using
MAGES-GHG, an 18-region numerical simulation model with new estimates
for BAU emissions uncertainties. Here a party is a country, its activity level
is GDP, and only part of its emissions are linked to GDP. Among the key
global results are that under risk neutrality, a tax raises welfare by 14%
above ET, which itself is vastly better than non-tradable targets. The tax’s
38dominance is well-known in the context of climate policy. However, we
hope that its presentation here, as an automatically revenue-neutral
mechanism, may lift some interest in it away from the economist’s
understandable but forlorn interest in revenue-raising mechanisms, towards
a politically more realistic revival of the carbon tax option.
Under risk aversion, uncertainty lowers welfare by much more under ET
than under a tax; while NTTs are no longer computable, because a single
shadow price is no longer optimal. Nevertheless we use the worst feasible
mechanism − ET with unindexed targets − as our reference case, because it
is politically most accepted. Compared to this, an optimally indexed tax
gives about 60% more welfare and 30% more abatement, while optimally
indexed ET achieves roughly two-fifths of these maximal improvements.
The broad picture we paint is therefore that taxes remain the best
instrument under uncertainty with flat marginal benefits, but they need
thresholds to be politically acceptable, and ideally, those thresholds should
also be flexible. So far, this message has not been received in the world of
policymaking, where quantity instruments (emissions trading schemes) are
on the rise; but these should at least have flexible targets, as long as the
extra complexity arising remains manageable.
Our results suggest several different strands of further work. The first
and foremost is to measure the scope for free riding, by deriving results for
parties joining or leaving an abatement policy one by one, rather than
altogether. One is to apply them to other pollutants which are genuinely
‘global’ in nature, or have been treated as such by current policies (the
obvious example being SO2 trading in the USA). Another is to compare the
results here with those of Pizer (2002), Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) and
others working on hybrids between price and quantity control, such as ET
with a price cap (a ‘safety valve’). Any price cap is effectively a truncation
39condition which will complicate taking multinormal expectations, but may
be possible using techniques we have developed in preliminary work on
applying MAGES to the idea of non-binding targets (following up an idea
in Philibert 2000). And our rebate mechanism that is essential to achieving
global revenue-neutrality for a tax with thresholds raises many practical and
policy questions that deserve further exploration.
40APPENDIX 1 NET BENEFIT FROM EMISSIONS TRADING
From [2.48] with j = T, party i’s realised net benefit under ET is
A ~T
i := ViQ ~T −½ Wi(Q ~T)
2 + R ~T
i − ½(1/Mi)Q ~T
i
2 − (1/Mi)Q ~T
iN ~
Ci [A1.1]
Next, from [3.3], permit sales revenue is
R ~T
i := p ~T(X ~T
i−E ~T
i), which by [2.3] and [2.14]






Ei)], which by [2.49]





















− ½(1/Mi)(p ~TMi−N ~
Ci)
2 − (1/Mi)(p ~TMi−N ~
Ci)N ~
Ci [A1.3]
which can be shown by lengthy algebra [see Referees’ Appendix 2] to be
A ~T
i = A −T

























2 − (1/M)N ~
Ei
























i)/M + Vi − Wip








i)/M, as in [3.8].
Summing all these results gives global realised net benefit:







A −T = p









TVM −½ ( p
T)
2M(1+WM); as in [2.63]
41F ~T = ½(1/M−W)N ~
E
2 − (1/M)ΣN ~
Ei





2 − (1/M)ΣN ~
Ci












E = V − Wp
TM, H
T
C = 0. [A1.8]
Finally, taking expectations gives
A
T = A −T + F
T, where A −T is as in [2.63], and [A1.9]
F
T := ½(1/M−W)DE − (1/M)DE + ½(1/M)ΣDCi +½ Σ(1/Mi)DCi − (1/M)DC
=−½ Σ(1/M+W)DEi +½ Σ(1/Mi−1/M)DCi. as in [2.60]
The variants with absolute or intensity targets are thus
A
T0 = A −T −½ Σ(1/M+W)D
0
Ei +½ Σ(1/Mi−1/M)DCi, as in [2.65],
& A
T* = A −T −½ Σ(1/M+W)D
*
Ei +½ Σ(1/Mi−1/M)DCi. as in [2.66]
As before, A −T contains no error variances, so does not need the
0 superscript.
APPENDIX 2 NET BENEFIT FROM TAX WITH THRESHOLDS
From [2.48] and [2.32], party i’s realised net benefit under a tax with
thresholds, compared to no abatement anywhere, is
A ~$
i := ViQ ~$ −½ Wi(Q ~$)






























42Inserting these and [2.54] into [A2.1] then gives, after some algebra:
8
A ~$
i = A −$
























i) as in [3.28]
F ~$
i := (1/2Mi)N ~
Ci
2 −½ WiN ~
C














$ − Vi + Wip
$M as in [3.32].
The variant with absolute rather than flexible targets comes from adding a










The corresponding global sums are:






A −$ := p
$VM −½ ( p
$)
2M(1+WM); [A2.7]
F ~$ := ½Σ(1/Mi)N ~
Ci







Expected global net benefit is then
A
$ = A −$ +½ Σ(1/Mi−W)DCi as in [2.61].




























































































































































43APPENDIX 3 NET BENEFIT FROM NON-TRADABLE TARGETS
From [2.48] with
j =
@ and R ~@
i = 0, party i’s realised net benefit is
A ~@
i = ViQ ~@ −½ Wi(Q ~@)
2 − ½(1/Mi)(Q ~@
i)
2 − (1/Mi)Q ~@
iN ~
Ci, [A3.1]






























2 − ½(1/Mi)N ~
Ei




i = A −@















i : =−½ WiN ~
E
2 − ½(1/Mi)N ~
Ei





Ei := Vi − Wip
@M. [A3.6]
The global totals are then







A −@ := p
@VM −½ M(1+WM)(p
@)
2, as in [2.62], and
F ~@ : =−½ WN ~
E
2 −½ Σ(1/Mi)N ~
Ei





@ = A −@ −½ Σ(1/Mi+W)DEi. as in [2.62].
The variant with absolute or intensity rather than general flexible targets is
obtained by just adding a
0 or
* superscript to terms containing DEi, thus
A
@0 = A −@ −½ Σ(1/Mi+W)DE
0
i, and as in [2.68]
A
@* =½ p −VM −½ Σ(1/Mi+W)D
*
Ei, as in [2.69].
Since A −@ contains no error variances, it does not need the
0 superscript.
44APPENDIX 4 NET BENEFIT FROM UNILATERALISM




i := ViQ ~U −½ Wi(Q ~U)
2 − ½(1/Mi)(Q ~U
i)
2 − (1/Mi)Q ~U
iN ~
Ci, as in [2.70],
on the assumption that ∂Q ~U/∂Q ~U
i = 1. Hence
∂A ~U
i/∂Q ~U
i = Vi − WiQ ~U − (1/Mi)Q ~U
i − (1/Mi)N ~
Ci =0
⇒ Q ~U
i = ViMi − N ~
Ci − WiMiQ ~U, which on summing [A4.2]
⇒ Q ~U = Σ(ViMi−N ~
Ci)−ΣWkMkQ ~U
⇒ Q ~U = Σ(ViMi−N ~
Ci) / (1+ΣWkMk) as in [2.71]
⇒ Q




















So from [2.70] and [A4.2],
A ~U
i := ViQ ~U −½ Wi(Q ~U)





Ci; as in [2.73]
⇒ A
U





























2] + ½(1/Mi)DCi as in [2.77].
9. We choose this maximand for simplicity for the risk-averse as well as the risk-
neutral case. For formal consistency, under risk aversion i should maximise not its
expected net benefit, but its expected payoff. However, the latter maximisation has
no analytic solution and differs only very slightly from the former.












































Since Z and F
j















































































































i (both are scalars). [A5.3]

































































The integral here is now that of an multinormal probability density







−1 instead of Z, covering






of ε, but this makes no difference since the whole space is integrated over).
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49Referees’ Appendix 1 Notation and Acronyms
Dimensions (units of measurement) are shown in square brackets; [1] indicates a
dimensionless number; equation numbers show where the term is introduced.
a
A ~j
i := B ~j
i − C ~j
i = party i’s dollar-valued net benefit (Advantage) from abatement
under policy mechanism j [$/yr] [2.34]
A
j






i party i’s net benefit from policy j under certainty [3.4]
A
U
i party i’s dollar-valued net benefit (Advantage) from unilateral abatement by all
parties [$/yr] [3.33]
b billion (= 10




B global Benefit of global abatement [$/yr]
B ~j
i := ViQ ~j−½Wi(Q ~j)










i = party i’s Cost (net of emissions trading) of its own












































e the number e
E[.] Expectation operator
E ~j
i party i’s actual Emissions under abatement mechanism j [t/yr] [2.3]
E
b
i party i’s expectedbusiness-As-Usual (unabated) Emissions [t/yr] [2.4]
50E ~b
i party i’s realised business-As-Usual (unabated) Emissions [t/yr] [2.4]
ET (inter-party) Emissions Trading
f(.) arbitrary function
F ~j
i part of realised net benefit A ~j
i containing squared and cross errors [3.6]
future in 2020
g
G giga (= 10
9 = billion)
G
j expected global gain from mechanism j
G ~j
i party i’s realised Gain from mechanism j := A ~j
i − A ~U
i
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHG GreenHouse Gas(es)
h






























i one of n or n−1 parties (never a single unilateralist or NBT holder)
i denotes party i (used with n or n−1 parties)
−i denotes sum over all parties except i
I arbitrary integral





J arbitrary constant, limit of integration or (with~) random variable
k one of n parties
K ~$
i gross tax revenue to party i [2.29]
l
Li population of party i [person]




i, relative abatement potential [t/$]
51M mega (= 10
6 = million)
MAC Marginal Abatement Cost
Mi party i’s absolute abatement potential (inverse slope of MAC curve)
[t
2/$.yr] [2.41]
n full number of parties included in abatement policy [1]
N ~
Ci := MiεCi = weighted marginal abatement cost uncertainty [$/t] [2.41]
N
~










Ei := [αiεηi+(1−αi)ερi] E
b
i [2.23]
p expected world emissions price or shadow price [$/t] [2.46]




i party i’s realised abatement under mechanism j [Gt/yr] [2.3]
r risk aversion parameter (curvature of payoff function) [yr/$] [2.34]
R ~j
i party i’s trading revenue from abatement mechanism j [$/yr] [2.27]
s arbitrary function argument, or integration variable
t tonne of CO2-equivalent of GHG
tt ime (used for cumulative emission responsibility) [yr]
T denotes Emissions Trading [2.26]
U ~j
i Payoff from i’s $-valued gain from abatement mechanism j [$/yr] [2.36]
U denotes global unilateral abatement scenario sec 2.3(iii)
Vi party i’s linear Value per unit of global abatement B ~
i [$/t] [2.38]
w




i, party i’s expected absolute emissions target as proportion of expected
BAU emissions [1] [2.8]




i(1+βiεYi) = party i’s realised, absolute (but uncertain) emissions target
under flexible tradable permits [t/yr] [2.8]
yi := Yi/Li, party i’s expected, future per capita GDP
yr year
52Yi party i’s expected future GDP [$/yr] [2.12]
Y ~
i = Yi(1+εYi) = party i’s realised future GDP [$/yr] [2.12]
zi multiplier of risk-averse part of payoff [2.36]
Z
αi proportion of economy i in which emissions are GDP-linked [2.4]
βi degree to which i’s emissions target is indexed to GDP [1] [2.8]
βi


































εCi absolute random part of C ~
i [$/yr] [2.41]
εYi BAU emissions error caused by GDP fluctuations [1] [2.4]
εηi BAU emissions error caused by intensity fluctuations [1] [2.4]




















































π the number pi, as in normal distributions
53ρ denotes part of economy where emissions are independent of GDP and
intensity [3.5]
Σ summation symbol, over i or k = 1,...,n
Σ−i summation over all k ≠ i
σCi standard deviation of absolute uncertainty in i’s MAC [$/t] [2.42]
σYi standard deviation of proportional uncertainty in i’s GDP [1] [2.7]
σηi standard deviation of proportional uncertainty in i’s intensity [1] [2.7]


















~ denotes random or uncertain variable (with J := E[J ~] for any J ~)
− denotes expectation of equivalent variable under certainty
$ US dollar amount in constant 2000 dollars
$ denotes a Tax with Thresholds [2.28]
@ denotes Non-Tradable Targets (NTTs) [2.33]
0 (as qualifier of
T or
@) denotes no indexation of threshold/target [2.21]
* (as qualifier of
T or
@) denotes optimal indexation of threshold/target [2.33]






























































































































































































































































































C as in [3.3]
where A −T
i := Vip



















































i)/M + Vi − Wip








i)/M, as in [3.8].
55